Friday, December 28, 2012

Army integration in post conflict enviroment: Game plan for failure?

One thing the international community loves is negotiated peace accords. Central Africa is a  graveyard of broken peace agreements, which more often than not unravel in the area of rebel-military integration. Integrating former rebels into the military structure of a state is a vital part of keeping the peace in any region torn by war, but it has yet to be undertaken with positive results. The script goes as follows: rebels feel powerless once weapons are set aside, the central government feels it no longer has to honor agreements, causing rebel forces to quickly reorganize, usually stating that demands of successful integration have not be implemented to the degree necessary. The cycle then repeats- war, negotiations, agreements. Currently, there three rebel groups that have rearmed under claims that integration agreements were not fulfilled- the MNLA in Mali, the M23 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and SELEKA in the Central African Republic. 

Why is it that rebel-military integration strategies fail? Current strategies in peacekeeping call for rebels to be integrated in to new national armies, yet this policy doesn't seem to work very well, if it works at all.

 One problem facing military integration is the willingness/ability of a state to fulfill the commitment. The ability of a weakened state to successfully integrate rebels in to the military apparatus can be greatly diminished due to conflict. The state could have every intention to implement agreements, but simply lack the capacity to act. The flip side is the state could intend to never fully implement rebel integration. Either way, the longer it takes to successfully integrate rebels in to a national army, the more likely it is that hostilities will return (usually within three years). Once the process begins, if it begins, former rebel leaders can feel that agreements are slow to be honored or that the state is simply ignoring the necessity for integration, whatever the true motive of the state may be. In cases where there has been some success at rebel-military integration, like in the DRC with former CNDP combatants, rebel leaders have been dissatisfied with the results and rearmed.  

Successful implementation of rebels in to national armies involves reorganizing current armies in to new national armies, with former rebels given positions at all levels of command. In most cases, such as in the DRC, the agreements call for former combatants to be spread throughout the armed forces. If former rebel groups are placed in areas that were once strongholds and are placed under the command of former rebel leaders, mutinies happen (see M23). Reorganizing an army takes resources and work, which can be daunting for states recovering from war. The UN and international community tend to help the state with restructuring, but once policies and frameworks have been laid out, the state is left on its own.  If there is no trust between the former rebel groups and the central government, the resurgence of hostilities is likely. 

There are many factors that cause the failure of rebel-military integration agreements, and this is an area of research that has attracted my attention. It seems that the current framework of rebel-military integration sets agreements up to fail, yet there has not been enough data compiled to successfully revamp policies. I know that it is something I will be following with great interest. For now, it seems rebels and states are stuck in a cycle of failure.


Thursday, December 27, 2012

Ethnicity, Islam, and coup d'état in Mali

Mali is a west African state that is famous for Timbuktu and having a large nomadic population. It is also landlocked and poor. Recently, Mali has been in the headlines for a military coup that was in response to poor management of a Tuareg rebellion. The irony- shortly after the coup all of north Mali fell in to rebel hands. North Mali is currently controlled by two rebel groups, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) a Tuareg separatist group, and Ansar Dine, backed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (cue United States interest). Recent articles have highlighted Ansar Dine's condemnable actions in northern Mali- enforcing Sharia law, cutting off limbs, and destroying UNESCO World Heritage sites in and around Timbuktu. Western states and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), along with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have issued strongly worded statements condemning the actions of  both the Mali junta (for staging the coup) and the jihad-driven Ansar Dine. On December 20, 2012, the UNSC issued Resolution 2085, calling for an ECOWAS military force to stabilize and reclaim the northern territory- perhaps, sometime, in the next year or so, but only after all diplomatic measures had been taken. Several policy experts have criticized the UNSC as too little, too late (Drezner at Foreign Policy on how the UNSC is like grad school). I claim no expertise on Mali or the current situation, but I can tell you that I have seen better resolutions come out of a Model UN conference.

What exactly is happening in Mali? Who are the Tuareg and why do they want the north liberated? What is al-qaeda doing in Mali, besides destroying parts of Islamic history? Why did the army find it in the best interest to stage a coup, then lose over half the country to rebels, then force out another civilian leader? What can ECOWAS do to stabilize the situation?

To start, the Tuareg rebellion is the keystone. The Tuareg are Berber, and live a nomadic lifestyle in the interior of Africa, making a home of the vast Sahara desert. The Tuareg people cover an area that stretches from Mali north through Algeria, and across in to Libya and Niger. Mali gained independence from France in the 1960s, and the new state crushed the first Tuareg rebellion, leading to deep resentments. This caused the rebellion of the 1990s, which ended in 1992 with a negotiated peace settlement. Part of the peace agreement was the decentralization of power and the integration of rebel fighters into Mali's army. Things seemed to settle down, until October 2011, when fighters from Libya's civil war returned to Mali and formed the MNLA. In April of 2012, the MNLA declared the secession of Azawad from Mali. The MNLA is a secular rebel movement, and that brought tensions and clashes with Ansar Dine. Ansar Dine managed to get the upper hand in a series of battles, leading to a recent 'peace agreement' between the two factions.

Ansar Dine benefited from the MNLA's actions at the beginning of 2012. In January, the MNLA opened hostilities with the central government of Mali. As Mali lost more territory to the rebellion, the military decided to take matters into its own hands, and in March of 2012 members of the military formed the  National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State, and took over state media and the presidential palace, placing Amadou Toumani Touré under house arrest. The stated cause for the coup was that Toure had mishandled the rebellion in the north. ECOWAS and the UNSC sprung into diplomatic action and issued condemnations of the junta. While the junta was taking over the government, the rebels were taking over Mali. The international community responded by doing the usual nothing, and the situation for civilians in Mali, especially in the northern region, went from bad to worse.

Ansar Dine is the rebel group that is getting the most press coverage, mainly due to the extreme actions of their fighters. Reports of amputations for crimes have poured out of AD controlled areas and the local economies that thrived on tourist dollars are near collapse. The destruction of Islamic tombs by AD has been thoroughly covered by the Western press and highlights just how radical the AD are in their ideology. This movement is rather different from the MNLA- while MNLA seeks independence from central government control, AD just wants all of Mali to become an Islamic state, under strict Sharia law. 

The UNSC passed resolutions in July and December calling for action in Mali, but the French seem to be the only western state ready to take quick and decisive action to restore civilian government and drive out the rebels. This stems from France's protection of francophone Africa, and the fact that France never really left most of its former colonies. The central government of Mali is at a very weak state. Coup leader Amadou Sanogo ran the country for a brief moment, before stepping down after ECOWAS pressure. Yet in December, Prime Minister Diarra was arrested by the military for 'attempting to stay in power indefinitely'. His arrest was ordered by Sanogo, which led many to speculate that a second coup had occurred. Naturally, the military denied this. Currently, the military is thought to still be in control of the government under interim president Dioncounda Traore. Mali seems unable to drive the rebels back or take control of rebel territory, which leaves the ball in the international community's court. ECOWAS has stated it will (maybe) supply troops for stabilizing the country.

Human rights groups such as Amnesty International recently issued statements that any international force sent in to drive out the rebels would just make ethnic and religious tensions increase. Reports have accused both the government and rebels of torture, extra judicial killings, and other horrors. Rights groups are calling for the international community to take a measured response to the situation. The UNSC resolution is vague in nature, and doesn't have a clear plan for intervening in Mali. As always, it is the people of Mali that suffer. It will be interesting to see how the UN, France, and the US handle the situation. If any country acts it will be France, though the US is increasing military presence in Africa specifically to handle groups such as Ansar Dine. While no action is planned for some time (mid next year, maybe), for the moment it is a 'wait and see what else happens' ordeal.

What's going down in the C.A.R. (Blame France!)

Let's talk about the Central African Republic, shall we?

The C.A.R. is a landlocked, 'poor' state in Central Africa. It hardly ever makes the news, except for that one time when Kony was hiding there (he still is). Also, there are around 100 US Special Forces in the country, but only to catch Kony (and not because of some stupid, misguided internet video- the agreement was made between US and Western darling Uganda far before 'Invisible Children' came around). The CAR is rich in diamonds, gold, and minerals much like its larger neighbor the DRC.  Much like the DRC, the CAR suffers from corruption and an inability to use its natural wealth to build up infrastructure and civil society. Also, rebel groups like to use the CAR as a staging ground.

To understand the current reason why the CAR is a hot mess, history is a bit important. The CAR, formerly Ubangi-Shari, was a French colony that gained independence in 1960. The next thirty years saw little legitimate government- the military mostly ran the place. In the 1990s, a civilian government was established under Ange-Felix Patasse. It lasted about a decade, but it wasn't a very bright decade for democracy in the CAR, and in 2003 the military staged a coup, installing General Francois Bozize. The military government held 'elections' in 2005 that kept Bozize in power. Just for fun, elections were held in 2011, confirming Bozize as president yet again, but as you can guess, outside observers and civilians within the country claimed that voting was 'very flawed'. This brings us to the current situation in the CAR- a military government hiding under the blanket of rigged 'democratic' elections.

So, what about the rebels that are taking the country, claiming 10 cities and heading towards the capital of  Bangui (but they pinky promise that they won't take the it) and causing civilians to riot and protest outside the French embassy? To start, the current movement, Seleka, is composed of former rebel groups:
the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the Union of Democratic Forces for Action, the Movement of Centrafrican Liberators for Justice, and the People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD). In 2008, most of the rebels agreed to a peace accord with Bozize's government that called for the integration of the various rebel militias in to the state army. In January of 2012, the leader of the APRD (the main rebel group) Jean-Jacques Demafouth was arrested on charges of trying to regroup the former militias. This was the 'spark' that set the current trajectory. Upon Demafouth's arrest, the former rebels immediately called for a halt to any disarmament, demobilisation and social reinsertion (DDR). In December of 2012, the rebels started the assault on cities in CAR, and released a 10-point list of demands to the government.  Among the demands were respect of the Birao Agreement between the government and former rebels, and the full implementation of the recommendations of the last Inclusive National Dialogue. Col. Djouma Narkoyo, the leader of the rebel movement, stated that they have no intention of taking the capital if the government is willing to talk and fully implement the 2007 peace accords, but if Bozize won't negotiate, they like, totally will sack the capital and throw out Bozize. 

From all reports, Bangui is on edge. Yesterday, residents staged protests outside of the French embassy, throwing stones and shouting for France to 'DO SOMETHING BECAUSE THIS IS ALL YOUR FAULT, FORMER COLONIAL POWER'. Air France cancelled its daily flight into Bangui due to the protests, and French president Hollande stated that while France would protect its 'interests' in the CAR (minerals, expats, ect) France would in no way protect any 'regime'. This means that it is not likely that there is any willingness to stop the rapid rebel advance, outside of UN Security Council condemnations. There is a force of various Central African states, MICOPAX, stationed in the CAR to help stabilize the country, and last week Chad sent more troops at the request of Bozize. Yet, there is little chance the MICOPAX troops will stop the rebels, as it has been stated the troops are there to act as a peacekeeping force.                                     


With little support for an illegitimate regime, it seems likely that the rebels will eventually take the capital and install new leadership. It all depends on Bozize and his willingness to open negotiations. Meanwhile, residents in Bangui are very worried about the possibility of war on the streets, and humanitarian organizations are releasing reports of civilians fleeing the rebel advance, stating the situation is deteriorating rapidly. Whether the CAR will have a new military government, or another negotiated settlement, is anyone's guess at the moment.

Wednesday, December 26, 2012

With a rebel yell, they cried 'more, more, more.'

Rebels and Africa- two things that have gone together for as long as I have studied the continent. In post colonial Africa an alphabet soup of rebel movements have ebbed and flowed with outcomes ranging -- fought and won, fought and lost, or fought and negotiated an agreement. Negotiated agreements work or fail, and the cycle starts over.

In sub-Saharan Africa, rebel movements have shaped the politics, economies, and armies of some of Africa's largest and smallest states. Some movements gain legitimacy and power through outright military victory. The Front patriotique rwandais (Rwandan Patriotic Front) under the helm of Paul Kagame, has formed a less than democratic government in Rwanda since coming to power after the genocide of 1994, and has retained control of the small country for almost 20 years. Kagame keeps a tight leash on Rwandans, and there is little dissent allowed in the press or in political opposition. Rwanda also is highly involved in its much larger neighbor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The RPF has backed rebel movements in the Congo since 1996, causing a series of wars that have killed over 5 million people. War is good business in central Africa, and the RPF has reaped the benefits of the mineral rich Congo, increasing Rwanda's GDP and export business in minerals and precious metals. To the south, in the 'false twin' of Burundi, the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Council for the Defense of Democracy) came to power after a brutal civil war that killed over 200,000 people. In a negotiated treaty, the CNDD became a legitimate political party and brought much hope to the war-torn state, winning open elections in 2006. However, the last election cycle in 2010 was marred by attacks and claims of fraud, with the Front de Liberation Nationale boycotting the election. The CNDD struggles to maintain control of the country, with new rebel groups forming to challenge what is perceived to be a government that stifles dissent and runs on corruption. In August of 2012, the Murundi People's Front, 'the Saviours' (FPM-Abatabazi) attacked and killed people in Buganda, in what was claimed to be the start of 'removing the yoke of Pierre Nkurunziza.'  

Instability in Rwanda and Burundi plays a large role in the troubles of the DRC. The Congo has been the site of almost non-stop warfare since the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The Congo Wars, or 'Africa's World War', is the most deadly conflict on the planet since WWII. Most of the instability in the east (North and South Kivu) traces to the political environments of its much smaller neighbors. Due to weak state governance, rebel movements have long used the DRC as a staging ground for bases and raids. Warlords control large parts of the eastern Congo, and the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) has reemerged after a failed army integration attempt, renamed the Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23). The same people run the new rebel movement (Bosco Ntaganda), which successfully took Goma earlier this month, and the same states finance the M23 (hello, Rwanda).  It's more of the same- failed negotiated settlement for army integration, claims of attacks against the Tutsi and the Banyamulenge. The M23 has caused several Western donors to Rwanda, including the United States, to demand that Rwanda stop funding the rebels, but little has come of that. Negotiations continue in Kampala, Uganda, but one party or the other usually fails to even show up for talks. Hundreds of thousands of Congolese have once again fled their homes to avoid violence. While the M23 grabs the headlines, the Mai-Mai groups (local militias of which there are several, and always switching sides) and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) remain ever persistent in the Kivus, giving Rwanda enough to feel justified in violating DRC sovereignty.    

And that is just three African states. And it doesn't even begin to explain the overall situation.

The Central African Republic is often overlooked- it's poor, underdeveloped, and never spoken of. In fact, the only time the C.A.R. managed to get any news coverage this year was when a misguided internet activism campaign highlighted the fact that Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) might be hiding there, and we should really DO SOMETHING about that, since he is a bad guy and uses child soldiers. Yet, things bigger than Kony have been happening in the C.A.R. In recent weeks, the Union for the Democratic Forces for Unity  (UFDR), a rebel movement composed of three smaller rebel groups, has seized over 10 towns, and continue to take more territory. Col. Djouma Narkoyo, the rebellion leader, stated that the rebels have no plans to take the capitol city, and will negotiate with the state. This rebellion stems from a failed negotiated integration agreement that was signed in 2007. Rebels claim the agreement has not been implemented correctly. US Special Forces are already in the CAR (to hunt for Kony), but there is little chance that the US will help the central government repel the rebel advance. The C.A.R has a long history of rebellions, and has also been used as a staging ground by rebel movements in Chad.

As 2012 draws to a close and a new year dawns, African states are facing the same old rebellions. It will be interesting to see if Kagame continues to intervene in the DRC (answer- yes), if the CNDD keeps the peace in Burundi (answer-maybe) and how/if Kabila can handle the M23 considering how his government lacks support and legitimacy (my bet- he can't).

Still, rebellion and armed conflict is not all that Africa produces. Here are the top world music albums of 2012- with African style!   http://www.npr.org/blogs/bestmusic2012/2012/12/22/167750238/top-10-world-music-albums-of-2012