Army integration in post conflict enviroment: Game plan for failure?

One thing the international community loves is negotiated peace accords. Central Africa is a  graveyard of broken peace agreements, which more often than not unravel in the area of rebel-military integration. Integrating former rebels into the military structure of a state is a vital part of keeping the peace in any region torn by war, but it has yet to be undertaken with positive results. The script goes as follows: rebels feel powerless once weapons are set aside, the central government feels it no longer has to honor agreements, causing rebel forces to quickly reorganize, usually stating that demands of successful integration have not be implemented to the degree necessary. The cycle then repeats- war, negotiations, agreements. Currently, there three rebel groups that have rearmed under claims that integration agreements were not fulfilled- the MNLA in Mali, the M23 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and SELEKA in the Central African Republic. 

Why is it that rebel-military integration strategies fail? Current strategies in peacekeeping call for rebels to be integrated in to new national armies, yet this policy doesn't seem to work very well, if it works at all.

 One problem facing military integration is the willingness/ability of a state to fulfill the commitment. The ability of a weakened state to successfully integrate rebels in to the military apparatus can be greatly diminished due to conflict. The state could have every intention to implement agreements, but simply lack the capacity to act. The flip side is the state could intend to never fully implement rebel integration. Either way, the longer it takes to successfully integrate rebels in to a national army, the more likely it is that hostilities will return (usually within three years). Once the process begins, if it begins, former rebel leaders can feel that agreements are slow to be honored or that the state is simply ignoring the necessity for integration, whatever the true motive of the state may be. In cases where there has been some success at rebel-military integration, like in the DRC with former CNDP combatants, rebel leaders have been dissatisfied with the results and rearmed.  

Successful implementation of rebels in to national armies involves reorganizing current armies in to new national armies, with former rebels given positions at all levels of command. In most cases, such as in the DRC, the agreements call for former combatants to be spread throughout the armed forces. If former rebel groups are placed in areas that were once strongholds and are placed under the command of former rebel leaders, mutinies happen (see M23). Reorganizing an army takes resources and work, which can be daunting for states recovering from war. The UN and international community tend to help the state with restructuring, but once policies and frameworks have been laid out, the state is left on its own.  If there is no trust between the former rebel groups and the central government, the resurgence of hostilities is likely. 

There are many factors that cause the failure of rebel-military integration agreements, and this is an area of research that has attracted my attention. It seems that the current framework of rebel-military integration sets agreements up to fail, yet there has not been enough data compiled to successfully revamp policies. I know that it is something I will be following with great interest. For now, it seems rebels and states are stuck in a cycle of failure.